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Many modern psychological theories still assume that humans
know about themselves to a wide and accurate extent, in line
with the early classical cognitive frameworks. Other compet-
ing frameworks, such as dynamic cognition, propose that in-
telligent behavior can arise from an interaction between the
brain, body, and environment, without the need of manipu-
lating explicitly represented knowledge-states. Intentions, i.e.
the dispositions to do a specific action, are one such type of
mental events that is assumed to be internally monitored to
an accurate extent, and is heavily involved in theories mod-
eling goal-directed action. The dynamic framework suggests
that there is no reason to assume that humans would naturally
have high introspective access to intentions, or are in need of
them when making goal-directed actions in the first place. In
this study, the extent to which we monitor eye movement inten-
tions, i.e. the intentions to shift one’s gaze towards a specific
location, and whether they can be expressed in conscious ex-
perience, is investigated. A forced-choice decision task was
developed where a pair of faces moved systematically across
the screen. In some trials, the pair of faces moved addition-
ally as soon as the participants attempted to gaze at the face
which was in the front of the movement direction, such that the
participants would never see the ’front’ face within the center
of their gaze. The results of the experiment suggest that hu-
mans in general do not monitor their eye movement intentions
in a way that allows for mismatches to be consciously experi-
enced and expressed. It was also possible to bias participants
into not choosing the alternative that escaped the center of
their gaze, if both faces were highly attractive, and doing so
without the participants being aware of the manipulation. The
results suggest that oculomotor control is another cognitive
domain that humans have low access to, and that theoretical
models that assume intentions to be central in goal-directed
action need to be revised.
1 Introduction
Psychological models attempting to explain how actions are
planned and decided often assume to a large extent that peo-
ple know what their goals, desires, and attitudes are, and
subsequently know their intentions prior to the corresponding
planned actions (see e.g. Ajzen, 1991; Dickinson & Balleine,
1994). Furthermore, if there was a mismatch between a per-
son’s intention and the outcome of the action, the assumption
is that she would notice the mismatch, which would diminish
her sense of agency (Haggard, 2017; Hommel, 2015). These
theories and their assumptions make sense given the classi-
cal framework of symbolic cognition, where it is assumed that
mental activity, such as problem-solving, is achieved by ac-
quiring, storing, fetching and manipulating knowledge-states
(Newell & Simon, 1976; Fodor, 1985; Laird, Newell & Rosen-
bloom, 1987). Modern theories on the mind regarding goal-
directed action that include intentions still make use of these
assumptions that are found in the classical framework. Inten-
tions do make perfect sense in that view, as intentions would be
a natural step between a goal-state which is relatively abstract
and initiating a specific action which is fully concrete. Re-
lating intentions to actions and agency is also most often im-
plicitly assumed in common sense psychological talk, which
increases familiarity to the concept and possibly biases theo-
reticians into developing models that include intentions. How-
ever, modern and more promising views of cognition, such as
the dynamic paradigm, do not need to assume that minds per-
petually represent knowledge-states explicitly. Instead, minds
can be embodied and dynamically coupled with the environ-
ment, acting intelligently with the environment directly as a
result of the environment interacting with the mind and body
(van Gelder, 1995; Wojnowicz et al., 2009; Pa¨rnamets et al.,
2015). In these views, it is not clear why actions that appear to
be planned necessarily need prior intentions, or intention-like
states, that can or can not be brought to awareness, to func-
tion (whether an ’intention’ refers to a distinguishable neural
activity with causal efficacy that is semantically related, or is
merely a helpful concept that does not refer to a distinguish-
able neural activity but still captures some relevance in neural
activity, is also an issue, but that will be put aside in this essay;
for a relevant discussion see Dennett, 1991). The choice of ac-
tion can instead result from a complex interplay between the
embodied brain, environment and task, where intentions and
conscious planning can be invoked in a post hoc explanation
to rationalize and explain the decision to act in the given way,
whilst not necessarily providing a veridical or helpful causal
account of how the decision for that action was generated.
Empirical evidence against the position that we generally
know ourselves accurately is also accumulating. It has for ex-
ample been shown that we can be made to accept false ac-
counts of immediately prior decisions we made ourselves (ac-
cepting a decision we did not make as if we made that deci-
sion), without becoming aware of those mismatches, and then
provide serious explanations for why we made those manipu-
lated choices (Johansson et al., 2005). Johansson et al. demon-
strated this by presenting two pictures of faces to participants
where they had to decide which face they found more attrac-
tive. In some trials, when the participants were given the pic-
ture of the face they chose, the experiment leader using sleight
of hand gave the participants a picture of the opposite face.
Most participants did not become aware of this mismatch, and
then proceeded to confabulate as to why they chose the face
they held in their hand as if that was the face they actually
preferred.
It has also been reviewed and found that we are often un-
aware of the stimulus that influenced a response from us, and
we are often unaware of the response itself, and we are also
unaware that the stimulus caused a specific response from us
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Based on such evidence, and the
fact that we often misattribute causes for other people’s ac-
tions, it has been argued that we self-interpret our own mental
states in the same fashion as we interpret other people (Car-
ruthers, 2011). As Carruthers has argued, the ability to in-
trospect might have primarily evolved as we learned to inter-
pret other people’s mental states, with our ability to interpret
mental states being approximative at best. If that were the
case, models assuming that humans know themselves well,
and make use of information about themselves to make de-
cisions (such as goal-directed action models that centrally in-
clude explicit intentions, attitudes or beliefs), would need to be
revised in light of the extent to which humans actually know
themselves.
Nevertheless, it evidently is the case that we can become
aware of our goals, desires and intentions, and we can plan
and then execute such plans consciously if we want to. We
can compare an intention to lift our arms, and the result of
our arms raising, and was it the case that our arms would not
move according to how we imagined them to, it would strike
our sense of agency and cause doubt in our perception of con-
trol (Haggard, 2017). This dichotomy between our ability to
bring things such as intentions and attitudes into awareness
and using these to plan actions, whilst also often exhibiting
false reports of what caused our actions, and not necessarily
being in need of intentions to produce appropriate planned be-
haviors in the first place, suggest that there is a need to explore
the role of intentions and possibly revise models that require
them.
Do we monitor our eye movement intentions?
A specific domain which has received very little research re-
garding the goal-directed action models are intentions of the
oculomotor kind, which is surprising as eye movements are
highly implicated in decision-making, and should therefore be
taken into account when modeling goal-directed action. Eye
movements have been shown to reflect ongoing thought pro-
cesses and behavioral goals (Yarbus, 1967), and to be tightly
coupled with visual attention (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Car-
rasco, 2011); and manipulating people’s gaze behavior in real-
time can affect preference formations for stimuli and dynam-
ically alter the decision process (Pa¨rnamets et al., 2015; Shi-
mojo et al., 2003; Krajbich, Armel & Rangel, 2010). On top of
that, the oculomotor system has been extensively researched
and modeled, so that much is known about how and which
brain areas are involved in controlling eye movements (Girard
& Berthoz, 2005; Sparks, 2002). Thus, as eye movements can
be measured accurately, they serve as good models for study-
ing goal-directed movements (Sparks, 2002).
Following goal-directed action models, one would assume
that for every top-down planned eye movement, there is a
corresponding intention that could be brought to awareness
should a person want to. As far as I am aware, no study has
investigated whether this is the case yet. Typical visual ex-
perience is highly stable, with eye movement control seem-
ingly being operated smoothly and automatically, suggesting
that even ’planned’ eye movements are often processed auto-
matically outside conscious thought. Yet it certainly is the case
that one can intend to shift one’s gaze towards a target within
one’s visual field if one wants to, so it seems that oculomotor
intentions are possible mental events.
The instantiating of oculomotor intentions that would be
relevant in goal-directed action models should occur for exam-
ple when a person is tasked with moving her gaze to a specific
location or object that she is aware of. It is then possible to
test if oculomotor intentions precede goal-directed eye move-
ments, by tasking participants in ways that would require them
to make such planned eye movements. To investigate whether
such oculomotor intentions are monitored, one could manip-
ulate the outcome of the participants’ eye movements, such
that the object they were supposed to move their gaze towards
moved away during the eye movement. The classical cogni-
tive views mentioned above then suggest that a person exposed
to such conditions would become aware of the mismatch be-
tween their intention to move their gaze towards a specific lo-
cation or object, and the result of their eye movement, which
did not succeed in reaching the target. One would only need to
make sure to mask the manipulation of the object movement,
such that it does not become obvious that a manipulation is
occurring, as that would confuse any interpretation of the sub-
jective experiences of the participants. The trick is that dur-
ing saccades, visual perception is limited such that it is possi-
ble to mask movements of objects (Beeler, 1967; Bridgeman,
Hendry & Stark, 1975), although if the target simply moved
once as the participant shifted her gaze towards it, the partici-
pant could become aware of the change as a result of the target
not being in the same location relative to the reference frame,
not because she was monitoring her eye movement intentions
and the potential error signal that occurred. Therefore, an ex-
perimental setup needs to circumvent any such effect such that
mismatches between the proposed intentions and the outcome
can be enhanced in the participants.
This project explores that which takes effect when such
mismatches between oculomotor intentions and the result of
the eye movements occur. This was done by developing a de-
cision task which sometimes is secretly gaze-contingent. By
making participants’ eye movements fail repeatedly in some
trials (whilst the participants believe that the target they are
trying to view is moving for other reasons), it follows from
goal-directed action models that they would likely become
aware of their incapacity to move their eyes correctly towards
a target, even if they knew that they would have difficulties
viewing the target for other reasons. If participants do not be-
come aware of oculomotor failures relative to the oculomotor
intentions, it might be the case that such intentions do not nec-
essarily operate normally within the oculomotor system, even
when goal-directed eye movements are required. Or, it is pos-
sible that the intentions cannot be brought to awareness unless
explicitly being made to think about them. Either way, were
it the case that the failure of oculomotor intentions would not
be brought to awareness, it would imply that goal-directed ac-
tion models would need to be revised. It would also mean that
there exists an additional way of manipulating people without
them becoming aware of it, if such oculomotor intentions nor-
mally would not be monitored. If that were the case, new ways
of investigating the human mind would open up. In a more
dystopian outlook, it could also mean that billboards with eye
trackers incorporated could force naive people to view certain
products by following their gaze, biasing them into buying the
products. On the other hand, if participants would notice er-
rors in the expected outcome of their eye movements, it would
strengthen the view that people prepare themselves for out-
comes prior to executing the actions, even for eye movement
actions.
Goal-directed models of action
A representative goal-directed action model can be seen in Fig.
1, adapted from Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior (1991)
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(with regards to these kinds of models, goals are desire-states
of how we want the world to become through our actions,
that can be brought to consciousness, and vary in complex-
ity and temporality; goal-directed actions are actions that are
guided by these desire-states). Within this model, the planning
and deciding of actions are directly influenced by one’s inten-
tions (not all models of this kind make intentions explicitly
involved), whose strength is thought to predict the likelihood
of engaging in its corresponding action (Ajzen, 1991). The
type of intentions being focused on is that which is followed
by an action within a short window i.e. a few seconds, not
long-term intentions such as intending to watch a documen-
tary in the evening. Such short-term intentions are further-
more influenced by a range of evaluations. Evaluations are
influencing factors such as attitudes towards doing a specific
behavior, norms about what is appropriate to do, and impor-
tantly, perception of control, which ties in with our sense of
agency. These evaluations in turn are influenced by various
related belief states.
Intentions are central in this theory of reasoned action, as
they are thought to capture the motivational factors that guide
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). But it is important to point out that
there are also non-motivational factors that affect whether a
given intention is expressed in behavior, such as resources (e.g.
energy, time, money) and opportunity, and these are also taken
into consideration by the model. Thus, both motivational and
non-motivational factors interact with one’s perceived behav-
ioral control to determine whether a given behavior will be
expressed.
These kinds of models are highly similar to models de-
scribing how the sense of agency is acquired in humans, which
makes them targets of scrutiny as well. A prominent model re-
garding how the sense of agency is manifested does similarly
to Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior assume that an action is
preceded by an intention, which causes a motor plan to take
shape (Haggard, 2017). Importantly, as the plan is processed,
a ’forward model’, which is a prediction of how the expression
of the plan will affect the world and subsequently our percep-
tion of the world, is analyzed by a ’comparator’ module, to-
gether with the subsequent perception of the world, as the ac-
tion has expressed itself in the environment. If there is a low
discrepancy between the forward model and the outcome, high
sense of agency is maintained, while the greater the mismatch,
the less agency one feels (Hommel, 2015). This model would
predict, in an experiment where one’s actions do not lead to the
predicted outcome, that one’s sense of agency would diminish,
including for goal-directed oculomotor actions.
The neurophysiology of goal-directed actions and intentions
Examining the neurological basis for goal-directed actions and
intentions, the brain areas that are typically highlighted in
goal-directed action are the basal ganglia (BG) and the pre-
frontal cortex (PFC) (Buschman & Miller, 2014; Verschure,
Pennartz & Pezzulo, 2014; Lisman, 2014). The BG are impli-
cated in both habitual and goal-direction action control (Red-
grave et al., 2010), and seen as enabling actions that are de-
sired, and inhibiting those actions that are not desired and in
competition with the desired (Prescott, 2008). The PFC on the
other hand is involved in many higher-order cognitive func-
tions, those relevant for goal-directed behavior are for instance
representing task- and action-spaces (Verschure, Pennartz &
Pezzulo, 2014), and supporting the BG in making appropri-
Figure 1. The theory of reasoned action by Ajzen (1991). The choice
of actions is thought to be directly influenced by one’s intentions
which capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior. In-
tentions are in turn influenced by evaluative factors such as attitudes,
perceived norms and perceived behavioral control. The evaluative
factors in turn are influenced by a range of beliefs as beliefs about
one’s attitudes and beliefs about one’s control of body and world.
ate task-selections given the environmental and social context.
This is achieved through the high interconnectivity between
the BG and PFC (Prescott, 2008).
Regarding intentions, it has been found that changes in
electrical potential prior to executing planned actions can be
ascribed to areas in the frontal and parietal cortex (PC), areas
that are involved in motor control (Gilron, Simon & Mukamel,
2015, pp. 105-6). Since intentions come before action exe-
cution, it makes sense that activity prior to action execution
is designated as intentional, although it is difficult to distin-
guish such neuronal activity from activity that corresponds to
action planning. The supplementary motor area (SMA), pre-
SMA, and the premotor cortex, are included in the parts of the
frontal and parietal cortex that have been highlighted as im-
portant areas for intentions, and the SMA and premotor cor-
tex are high contributors for motor control themselves. Neu-
ronal activity with regards to planned intentional actions has
also been found in the parietal reach region (PRR, located in
the posterior PC) in macaque monkeys, prior to action exe-
cution (Scherberger, Jarvis & Andersen, 2005). In this case
the macaques were trained to either saccade or reach towards
a point, but not to execute the action until a cue is presented.
The activity measured was the changed and maintained ac-
tivity prior to and during the wait-period when they were not
allowed execute the action. That unique activity could then be
ascribed as intentional. Interestingly, they found much weaker
activity in these areas (PRR, posterior PC) when the planned
actions were saccades as compared to arm reaches, present-
ing a possibility that the conscious saliency of intentions for
humans might differ between the different types of intentions
one can have, if the same difference in activity is found in the
human brain.
Additionally, intentional disorders such as anarchic hand
syndrome, where affected patients sometimes perform goal-
directed actions whilst denying the intention to do so, are of-
ten associated with disturbances with the SMA (Della Sala &
Marchetti, 2005). This suggests that the SMA is heavily in-
volved with the feeling of intentions.
The oculomotor circuitry
The oculomotor system does also make use of the BG and
PFC in controlling non-reflexive eye movements, suggesting
that goal-directed eye movements are not substantially differ-
ent with regards to brain processing as compared to other kinds
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of motor control. Here it is also thought that the BG are in-
volved in selecting actions, and it does so through the help of
the PFC (Girand & Berthoz, 2005). For example, the dorsolat-
eral PFC supports a spatial working memory by storing target
positions, and is involved in motor planning and selecting re-
sponses in relation to goals (Lappi, 2016). The frontal and
supplemental eye field receives relevant input from the dorso-
lateral PFC and parietal eye field via the posterior parietal cor-
tex (which is involved in visuospatial attention), which then
engages in selection of action by interaction with the BG and
commanding the superior colliculus (SC) (Girand & Berthoz,
2005; Lappi, 2016). Shifting the gaze with rapid eye move-
ments (saccades) is then directly controlled by the saccadic
burst generators (which are located in the SC) via the brain
stem nuclei, whilst the cerebellum provides with additional
regulatory activity (Girand & Berthoz, 2005; Lappi, 2016).
One of the primary roles of the oculomotor system is to
gather visual information effectively. Given how the eyes are
built, with high visual acuity being restricted to a small part
of the retina (the fovea), forces us to rapidly rotate the eyes
every time we need detailed visual information from another
visible location. This is demonstrated as the typical gaze pat-
tern humans exhibit in everyday situations, where short fixa-
tions are interspersed with rapid eye movements (saccades).
A challenge with this setup is that rapid eye movements cause
the visual information to smear on the retina, such that we
effectively become blind during these short eye movements
(Deubel, 2004). Another problem is that the light reflection
from the world hits the retina differently each time the eye is
displaced, even if the objects which reflect the light are sta-
tionary. Unless the brain dealt with these neurocomputational
problems, we would perceive smears each time we moved our
eyes, and the world would look as if it jumped each time. Typ-
ical subjective visual experiences tell a different story, one of
the world as stable and continuous, so it evidently is the case
that the brain processes the rapidly shifting visual informa-
tion effectively, otherwise we would have clearly noticed it.
It should be noticed though that the visual processes making
sure the visual world is stable are unconscious, so it is possi-
ble that eye movement control is itself largely controlled un-
consciously even when eye movements directed by conscious
goals are made.
How exactly the brain solves the equations leading to the
rise of conscious visual percepts that are stable, in the midst of
rapid changes in visual information, is currently under debate.
One mechanism thought to provide with stability is the use of
corollary discharges (CD), which are motor command copies
that are thought to be sent to the visual systems in preparation
of the rapid shifts soon to arise as the motor system engages in
shifting the eyes (Sommer & Wurtz, 2008). Another factor is
the saccadic suppression taking place, which is the dampening
of processing new visual information during an interval shortly
before, during and after a saccade, that hides the visual dis-
ruption (Kowler, 2011). Yet another factor is the occurrence of
certain visual neurons that remap their receptive fields, to the
area of the retina that currently processes the visual informa-
tion that is predicted to be processed by the remapping neurons
after the saccade, which prepares the neurons for the oncom-
ing change in visual information (Melcher & Colby, 2008). It
has also been argued, in an evolutionary fashion, that the visual
system assumes the world to be stable during eye movements
unless there is evidence of the contrary, so that processing new
visual information is facilitated by simply maintaining the pre-
vious processing to a certain degree (O’Regan, 1992).
Together, these mechanisms are thought to help create a
stable visual percept of the world, even though most people
are unaware of that these processes are taking place and are
necessary for a stable visual world. Such cognitive blindness
indicates that our metacognitive monitoring of the oculomo-
tor system is limited in some degree, or mostly inactive under
normal circumstances. Evidence supports this claim as it has
been found that we are not better than chance at identifying our
own eye movements from scan paths, as compared to someone
else’s eye movements in the same task (Clarke et al., 2016).
However, it is evident that if one would want to, one could
attend one’s eye movements and the decisions that control up-
coming gaze shifts. It is therefore relevant to explore to what
extent internal oculomotor signals are monitored consciously.
Eye movements and their role in decision-making
It is generally assumed that one’s visual attention is bound
with one’s gaze, as it is not possible to shift one’s gaze without
shifting one’s visual attention, although it is possible to shift
one’s attention without shifting one’s gaze (Deubel & Schnei-
der, 1996; Carrasco, 2011). This is partly the reason for why
the gaze behavior tells much about the thought processes of a
person, and why it is worth investigating both on-line as the
eye movements are occurring and off-line from recordings. It
also seems to be the case that eye movements are highly pur-
posive and task dependent (goal-directed but not necessarily
consciously monitored) in natural activities, where saccades
are made towards targets at ’just the right time’ when one
need to engage with them (Triesch et al., 2003), which is an-
other reason for studying eye movements as a window into the
mind. However, caution needs to be taken when interpreting
eye movement experiments recorded in laboratory settings, if
the setup is highly artificial with participants’ heads having to
be restrained. In naturalistic environments, the head and body
are most often not still, even when fixating on something with
the eyes. In such instances, compensatory eye movements are
engaged to keep the gaze fixed at the target. The result is that
fixations in naturalistic settings are not identical to fixations in
the lab, as in the lab the head itself is fixated to make make it
easier to measure the eyes (Lappi, 2016).
Nevertheless, eye movements play a tremendous role in
providing visual information even in artificial settings, even to
such a degree that eye movements can be manipulated in sev-
eral ways to alter decision-making in real time. One way to
bias decision-making is through increasing exposure towards
specific stimuli, for instance by limiting the amount of time a
person gets to view a stimulus, while decreasing exposure to
others (Montoya et al., 2017); although exactly how the expo-
sure effect alters subjective values is currently debated as there
are multiple models attempting to explain it. In general, it is
thought that as one is being exposed to a stimulus, more in-
formation is collected about it, which dynamically feeds one’s
preference or disposition towards that stimuli. This effect can
be seen to both increase one’s liking toward a target, if the tar-
get is appealing in the first place, or decrease preference if the
target is aversive (Armel, Beaumel & Rangel, 2008).
Preferences have been biased in experiments using eye
gaze dynamics for faces (Shimojo et al, 2003), moral positions
(Pa¨rnamets et al., 2015), and abstract shapes (Nittono & Wada,
2009), among other things. Shimojo and researchers did it by
manipulating the amount of orientations towards certain alter-
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natives, which increased the exposure towards those alterna-
tives, and according to the researchers the process of orienting
towards a target stands itself as a factor that biases preferences.
Pa¨rnamets et al. influenced preferences by dynamically termi-
nating the viewing process according to differences in accu-
mulated viewing time between two moral positions, and Nit-
tono and Wada did it purely by controlling stimuli exposure
time, increasing it for randomly selected stimuli.
This empirical evidence suggests that decisions are dynam-
ically processed in real-time, whereby available information
and environmental coupling is continually updating and influ-
encing the decision process, and vision seems to be a very
influential channel for feeding available information.
Predictive processing
Another framework that strikes the middle-ground between
viewing cognition as dynamic, but positions predictive states
(which intentions arguably could be classed as) as central in
perception and action, is the predictive processing framework
(PP). Instead of viewing the brain as a system which con-
structs reality and acts on it according to information gathered
through the senses, the PP framework assumes the brain to
do the opposite: it predicts top-down how the world should
be, given the experience and knowledge of the perceiver, and
the situated environment the perceiver is located in (Clark,
2015). This assumption turns out to explain many questions
pertaining to how it is possible for the brain to process the vast
amounts of information the senses provide each moment, and
how the brain manages to interact with the world through the
body seemingly without complication. Such a way of operat-
ing on perceptual information allows the brain “to select fru-
gal, action-based routines that reduce the demands on neural
processing and deliver fast, fluent forms of adaptive success”
(Clark, 2015, p. 1).
The general principle by how this process operates is that
the brain perpetually constructs what is called ‘generative’ or
‘forward’ models (Friston, 2012). For instance, the brain net-
works responsible for perception, are viewed as hierarchical
networks, where the topmost layers provide abstract predic-
tions (forward models) for the level below, and the further
down you go in the hierarchy, the more concrete both spa-
tially and temporally the predictions become (Clark, 2015, pp.
29-31). A level that receives predictions provides with error
signals back up based on how well the predictions it receives
matches the error signals that layer itself received from the pre-
dictions it sent to a layer below. The middle layers essentially
compute what the predictions it received failed to include or
exclude, from information that it received from another level
further down the hierarchy. This process repeats itself all the
way down to the sensory neurons, who are not thought to pro-
vide signals solely based on the stimulation they receives from
the world, but also on the predictions they received from their
corresponding level above (see Lupyan & Clark, 2015, for a
more thorough explanation together with figures).
Such a way of processing sensory information has been
shown for the visual system for instance, where it has been
found that ganglion cells do not signal the raw visual infor-
mation they get, but compute a difference between the raw
information and the predicted information they should receive
(Hosoya et al., 2005). Regarding higher-level functions, this
framework also excels at explaining neurological diseases like
autism and schizophrenia, among other things. Countless stud-
ies have shown how patients with schizophrenia have a re-
duced ‘mismatch negativity signal’, which has been inter-
preted as a weakened error signal (Todd et al., 2012). If a
predictive system lacks the ability to functionally check the
predictions and provide with error signals when the bottom-up
signals provide with information that does not match with the
predictions, the predictions stand unregulated, which explains
how schizophrenic patient can hallucinate objects and sounds
even when no such signals originate from the lower sensory
layers. It also explains how it is that we cannot tickle our-
selves: The tactile stimulation induced by self-stimulation is
down-regulated as a result of the forward model of the motor
system, which not incidentally is something schizophrenic pa-
tients are less capable of doing. And as the theory explains,
not being able to properly regulate forward models and sen-
sory signals is an explanation for why schizophrenic patient
have enhanced capabilities for self-induced tickling (Black-
more, Wolpert & Frith, 2000).
Crucially, predictive processing applies to action as well.
It is through action that we bring about the changes in sensory
stimuli which need to be predicted in the first place (Clark,
2015, pp. 6-7). Our motor plans allow us to form better pre-
dictions of the sensory outcome in the near future, which again
ties in with the ability to experience a sense of agency, since
when we cannot predict the outcome of our actions, there is
a loss in the sense of being able to do things according to
how one wants them to go, which is part of what being an
agent is. Similarly to the corollary discharges (motor com-
mand copies) that were mentioned for the oculomotor system,
the same is true for the motor system in general. Not sur-
prisingly, schizophrenic patient exhibit a weakened sense of
agency, which is linked to disturbances in their CDs; more-
over, schizophrenic patients exhibit multiple types of oculo-
motor disturbances, that are thought to be a result of the CD
disturbances (Thakkar, Diwadkar & Rolfs, 2017).
The PP framework predicts that there should be some sort
of error signaling present when oculomotor predictions fail,
such as for instance when intending to make a specific eye
movement with a result in mind, but achieving the wrong re-
sults. This has exactly been shown, where saccade-contingent
changes elicited error signals, that were found in the visual
cortex using electroencephalography (Ehinger, Ko¨nig & Os-
sando´n, 2015). The question though is whether these error
signals can be perceived consciously or not, as that has not
been demonstrated for oculomotor error signals as far as I am
aware. It is also not clear how error signals relate to intentions,
and if different error signals affect awareness differently. It
might be that when subject to severe circumstances with per-
petual mispredictions, causing repeating instances of error sig-
nals, one becomes more vigilant, with other conscious changes
relating to that, which might cause one to notice intentional
mismatches eventually. However, it is not given that humans
are able to directly experience such error signals. Noticing
mismatches between intentions and outcome might be done
through indirect means, such as through reasoning with other
sets of consciously available information.
Hypotheses
Although the project is exploratory in nature, several hypothe-
ses can be tested given the available theory. The goal-directed
action models postulate a specific role for intentions, in that
they are a required step before planned actions can execute.
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Figure 2. The presentation of a pair of faces in a decision trial (only
manipulated trials included gaze-contingent windows). If the move-
ment of direction was to the right, the gaze-contingent window was
centered on the face to the right, which was then called the ’front’
face, and vice versa if the movement of the pair was to the left. The
faces were separated by 5 degrees, although when transitioning from
the ’back’ to the ’front’ face, a movement would be triggered when
leaving the area of interest which was centered on the ’back’ face,
the barrier being approximately 3.6 degrees from the center of the
’front’ face. The grayed areas on this figure were not visible for the
participants.
Thus, if participants are being made to produce goal-directed
eye movements towards a target (goals that are consciously
available, e.g. “I want to look at that face”), but continually
fail in reaching it, the theory suggests that participants would
notice this mismatch between intention and results, and would
readily express it spontaneously in an interview after. It should
be noted however, that the participants need to expect that the
stimuli will move as part of the task, but not that the stimuli
will move as the participants attempt to look at them. This al-
lows for the participants to notice the manipulation only if they
monitor their eye movements intentions.
Another hypothesis is that according to the models on how
the dynamics of gaze can bias decisions, participants will be
less likely to choose the randomly blocked faces, as we move
those faces away from the participants’ gaze every time they
try to view those faces. This predicted bias is assumed to partly
be due to choosing the alternative one is more exposed to. And
since there is greater uncertainty about the blocked face as one
has not seen it properly, it is likely that one will not choose it
because of that. However, if the faces are unappealing, it is also
predicted that the participants will be less likely to choose the
face they are forced to view, even when the other face keeps
moving away from their gaze, as increased exposure to un-
appealing stimuli will increase confidence in not liking that
alternative.
It is also assumed that the participants will have worse
visual processing of faces that are made difficult to perceive
through the gaze-contingent manipulation, those faces which
participants will essentially be blocked in viewing. But to what
extent the perception of the blocked faces will be is unknown,
as in this experiment the participants will be given free con-
trol over the amount of time spent on each decision trial. By
allowing participants to freely control the exposure time, even
Figure 3. The beginning of a typical manipulated decision trial, with
a purple dot representing a schematic gaze position and movement.
A fixation marker could appear at any of 8 evenly spaced horizontal
locations, which would draw the participants gaze towards it. After
a random time between 1 and 2 seconds, the pair of faces would ap-
pear, with the ’back’ face always appearing where the fixation marker
(and most likely the participant’s gaze) was located. The ’front’ face
appeared either to the left or right of the ’back’ face depending on
the trial’s movement direction, which was randomly determined. The
faces together jumped 5 degrees in their movement direction after a
random amount of time between 42-292 ms, or when the participant
had triggered the gaze contingency by moving their gaze within the
gaze-contingent window in manipulated trials. When the pair of faces
reached the end of the monitor, such that another jump would locate
one of the faces ’outside’ of the screen, they instead reappeared on
the other end of the monitor and began anew in the same movement
direction. The grayed zone around the ’front’ face was not visible to
the participants.
when not being able to view one of the faces in a trial, the par-
ticipants effectively signal when they are satisfied with mak-
ing the decision each time they decide which face they find
more attractive, serving as an interesting factor when compar-
ing with their actual ability to discern whether they recognize
the face in a memory task later. This will be explored by a
memory test after the decisions have been made, where it is
expected that participants’ recognition of faces in a set of pre-
viously shown and not shown faces will be significantly re-
duced for the faces that were blocked from view.
2 Method
The purpose of the experiment was to explore to what extent
oculomotor intentions are monitored, and how that could ex-
press itself phenomenologically. Therefore, a forced decision
task was constructed where the alternatives in the decision, in
this case faces, jumped repeatedly across the screen, in order
to have a subset of these trials where participants would au-
tomatically fail in reaching one of the faces with their gaze,
as that alternative would always move away as they made a
saccade towards it. The movement of the faces in normal tri-
als was designed so as to effectively mask trials that were
gaze-contingent, by resembling the pattern of movement of
the stimuli during gaze-contingent trials. Hence, the stimuli
in manipulated trials would move in the same random way
as in trials without manipulation if the participants had their
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Table 1. The set of interview questions, translated into English from Swedish. The primary questions were always asked, while the follow-up
questions interjected whenever a participant expressed difficulties in seeing the faces during the experiment. Question 5 in the primary set was
not asked if previously answered in the follow-up questions.
Primary questions Follow-up questions
1. How do you feel about the experiment? 1. Why do you think it was like that?
2. Did you think about anything in particular during the experiment? 2. Was it difficult to see the faces in a particular position?
3. How did it feel to make the decisions? 3. Could you fixate both faces?
4. Was there anything in particular that you thought about regarding
the decisions?
4. Could you see both faces? If not, what strategy did you use when
making the decisions?
5. Did you evolve any strategies for decision-making? 5. Did the decisions feel free or dejected when it was difficult to see?
6. How do you feel about the faces?
7. Was there anything in particular that you thought about the faces?
8. Did you notice anything weird about the experiment?
9. If you had to guess about an undisclosed purpose of the experi-
ment, what would you guess?
eyes closed, but if the participants tried to view the designated
’blocked’ face, they would trigger the gaze contingency, which
would cause the faces to jump before the random wait-period
had expired.
An interview after the experiment peered into the partici-
pants’ phenomenology, in an attempt to explore the degree to
which the repeated failures of oculomotor intentions are self-
monitored. The presumption was that if the participants were
monitoring their oculomotor intentions, they would notice that
their eye movements caused the stimuli to move and that they
were unable to view one of the alternatives no matter how hard
they tried.
A memory phase followed the decision phase, asking them
whether they had seen the currently presented face, and if so,
whether they think they preferred that face in the decision it
was part of. By doing so, the participants’ recognition and
source memory for blocked and non-blocked faces could be
compared. The memory test would also serve as a control that
the manipulation worked.
Additionally, with this setup, we would also investigate
how decisions are affected when only one alternative is clearly
visible out of a pair, even though the participants would be
granted unlimited time to make their decisions.
Design
The experiment was a within-subject design, and consisted of
60 decision trials and 180 memory trials. In the decision tri-
als, pairs of faces were presented which rapidly jumped across
the screen, and the participants’ task was to decide which face
out of a pair they found more attractive. The five first decision
trials were always without gaze contingency, while the remain-
ing 55 trials could be either gaze-contingent or not with 50%
likelihood for either. The participants had unlimited time to
make each decision, and after each decision they had to input
their degree of confidence for the decision they just made.
The system used to accomplish the manipulation was pro-
grammed to block participants in viewing the face that was in
the first position of the pair relative to the direction of move-
ment in the manipulated trials. The strength of visual process-
ing in the periphery had thus to be accounted for, as this factor
would influence to what degree the participants could ’see’ the
blocked faces depending on the distance we separated them.
A study has shown that it is possible to reliably determine at-
tractivity between faces at distance of 5 visual degrees (Guo,
Lie & Roebuck, 2011), although in those pairs the attractiv-
ity difference was high between the faces. This is one of the
reasons for why the faces in a pair have been matched in at-
tractivity, provided through a norming table supplied by the
database used for the faces.
The distance between the faces had also to be taken into
account. The visual acuity relative to the fovea drops sharply,
such that at a distance of 5 degrees from the fovea, the relative
acuity is about 30% (Hans-Werner, 2006). It was thus deemed
good enough to separate the faces in a pair at 5 degrees, such
that participants could get a sense of the blocked face in ma-
nipulated trials, while in fact not being able to see its details
better than 30% of acuity compared to the face that was not
blocked.
The memory test, in which a single face was presented,
asking participants whether they recognize the face, included
the 60 pairs of faces that were part of the decision task, with
an additional 60 faces that were not previously presented, for
a total of 180 faces. Out of the total of 180 available faces,
those that were part of the decision phase were randomized for
each participant, while the faces always maintained the same
pairing. The order of the pairs in the decision phase and the
relative position of the faces within a pair (left vs. right) were
random as well. The pair of faces could also jump either in
a rightward or leftward direction, and the pair could appear
on the screen after the fixation marker at any of 7 different
positions.
Experimental setup and stimuli
The participants had their heads on a chin rest 80 cm in front of
a 27-inch LCD monitor (resolution at 1920 x 1080 pixels) with
a refresh rate at 120 Hz. The eyes were measured using the
Eyelink 1000 (SR Research, Ontario) that recorded monoc-
ularly at 1000 Hz, while the experiment was run on Python
2.7.3, mainly using the PsychoPy module (Pierce, 2007). All
eye movement data were recorded online after a nine-point
calibration (average measured accuracy = 0.47, SD = 0.33).
The faces came from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Cor-
rell & Wittenbrink, 2015). All faces used were frontal-view
Caucasian with neutral expression pre-rated for a number of
subjective attributes on a 1-7 point scale, and the faces were
paired gender-wise and according to their closest proximity in
attractivity scores, which were provided by the database. The
faces were divided into three attractivity groups, the highest
25% belonging to the ‘high’ attractivity group, the middle 50%
belonged to the ‘mid’-group, and the lowest 25% belonged to
the ‘low’-group. This divide was made to separate the high and
the low group as much as possible while maintaining enough
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faces in those groups to reliably show an effect for facial at-
tractivity in the decisions if it exists. The images of the faces
were resized to 244 (wide) x 172 (high) pixels, with a raised
cosine edge that was applied to provide softness to the images
(Fig. 2). The distance between the centers of the images in
a pair was approximately 5 visual degrees (230 pixels on the
screen at a distance of 80 cm from the eyes, 33 pixels/cm).
The gaze contingency was determined by a few conditions.
If the pair of faces were moving in the rightward direction,
and if the participant’s gaze crossed slightly before the ‘left’
image border, the stimuli would jump towards the right 5 vi-
sual degrees, as that would capture when the participant was
making a transition from the ’left’ towards the ‘right’ face.
But it could also be triggered if the gaze approached from the
other direction and came within 5 degrees of the center of the
‘right’ image (Fig. 2), as this could happen when the faces had
reached the edge of the monitor and spawned at the opposite
side, with the participant shifting her gaze across the screen to
catch up with the faces. The opposite applied if the direction
of the jumps were ’left’. But if the participant did not trig-
ger the gaze-contingent conditions, the movement of the faces
continued in the same fashion as normal trials.
The base rate at which the faces jumped in normal trials
was dependent on a few conditions designed to mask the fact
that the manipulated trials were gaze-contingent. The time a
pair would remain in position was a number of frames of equal
probability between 20-35, times the length in time for each
frame (at 120 Hz each frame was about 8.3 ms), such that
the pair could stay in the same position between about 166-
292 ms. Additionally, there was a 10% probability that the
faces would jump after only 5 frames (42 ms), to produce more
jittery behavior that resembles the gaze pattern of participants
attempting to view a blocked face in purely gaze contingent
conditions.
There was a total of 7 different positions that the pairs
could be located on, and as soon as a pair reached the edge
of the monitor, they appeared at the opposite side of the mon-
itor and began anew in the same direction as before (Fig. 3).
Participants
31 participants (17 female, 14 male) recruited at Lund Univer-
sity, mostly students (mean age = 26.1 years, SD = 7.1), took
fully part in the experiment. All participants reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision with contact lenses, as doing the
experiment with glasses was not allowed due to recording dif-
ficulties. The participants received compensation in the form
of a gift voucher valid at the movie theater for participating.
Measures and analysis
To determine whether participants monitored oculomotor in-
tentions consciously to any extent, a set of questions (Table 1)
was devised that would probe the participants’ subjective ex-
periences regarding oculomotor actions and decision-making,
while trying to limit the extent of leading questions that could
produce post hoc rationalizations. The set of primary ques-
tions was devised to scan for any experiences in the partici-
pants that could relate to oculomotor intentions, such as if they
felt that their eyes did not allow them to see one of the alterna-
tives, or whether it was impossible to see one of the faces no
matter how hard they tried to look at it. If any response from
the participants sufficiently seemed as there could be some rel-
evant awareness, a set of follow-up questions interjected wher-
Table 2. The frequency of participants belonging to the each category
of awareness.
Degree of awareness Amount
1. No reflections regarding perceiving the
faces clearly
3
2. Experienced difficulties perceiving both
faces clearly sometimes
18
3. Suspicious that faces were sometimes ma-
nipulated to be faint/blurry/unclear
7
4. Experienced feelings that faces sometimes
moved according to eye movements
0
5. Suspicious that faces moved according to
eye movements
3
ever that occurred in the primary set of questions, returning
back to the primary questions after the follow-up questions
were completed.
The degree of awareness was divided into 5 categories
specifically related to this experiment: whether the partici-
pant made no reflections regarding difficulties in viewing both
faces sometimes, whether the participant reflected that it was
difficult to perceive both faces sometimes, whether the partici-
pant reflected on being suspicious that something was done to
the faces making them more difficult to perceive sometimes,
whether the participant reflected that she felt as if her eye
movements affected the movement of the faces, and whether
the participant was suspicious that her eye movements directly
affected the movement of the faces. The answers participant
provided to the questions asked were then used to categorize
the participants accordingly.
To determine how the manipulation and relevant factors
affected decision-making and memory of the faces, general-
ized linear mixed models (GLMM) were calculated using the
lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2015). Participants’ confi-
dence were analyzed by a linear mixed model (LMM) with
the same R package. Random effects were modeled as per
participant intercepts, and reflecting the fixed effects structure
to the closest degree such that convergence was achieved. Sig-
nificance for fixed effects for the LMM was calculated with
the lmerTest package.
Signal detection analysis was used to calculate per partic-
ipant the sensitivity of recognizing faces, both comparing the
sensitivity for participants between faces belonging to either
decision trials that were manipulated or not, and comparing the
sensitivity participants had between faces that were blocked or
forced in the manipulated trials. The calculations for d’ were
done using the empirical probit transform.
The values from the confidence ratings would be used to
interpret the other results.
Procedure
Participants were introduced to the experiment, and were told
that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate how mov-
ing alternatives in a decision affected their decision-making.
They were told that several measurements would be recorded,
for instance pupil size and reaction time, but nothing about
eye movements. They were also told to make their decisions
without feeling pressured for time.
After being given the instructions, the participants were
monocularly calibrated. After that, the decision trials com-
menced. Participants had to make 60 decisions, and an ad-
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Figure 4. The predictive probabilities and their standard errors
of choosing the ’back’ face, which in manipulated trials were the
’forced’ faces which participants had forced biased viewing times
towards. The factors are trial type and attractivity, with their inter-
action included in the values. There was a significant difference be-
tween the trial types and between ’high’ and ’low’ attractivity, which
shows a shift in bias from the ’back’ and the ’front’ face when the
faces were ’low’ in attractivity. mani = manipulated trial; nomani =
non-manipulated trial.
ditional 60 confidence judgments intervening each decision
regarding how confident they felt they were about the deci-
sion they just made. In the decision trials, a fixation marker
spawned at one of 8 possible positions, and after a random
time between 1-2 seconds the pair of faces appeared, such that
if the direction was rightwards, the ‘left’ face spawned at the
spot that the fixation marker was at previously. The pair of
faces started moving immediately after spawning according to
its program, and the participant had unlimited time to make
the decision by pressing either ‘left’ or ‘right’ depending on
the preferred face. After each decision a confidence-scale ap-
peared, where the participant could input their confidence in
the previous decision on a continuous scale from 1.00 to 6.00.
After the decision phase, they were instructed about the
memory test, which they then proceeded to make 180 trials of.
During each trial a face appeared, with instructions asking if
they recognized the face, pressing ‘left’ for yes and ‘right’ for
no. If they answered positively, they were additionally asked
whether they think they chose that face in the decision trial it
was part of or not. Two-thirds of the faces had been presented
previously, but the participants were told that the ratio between
old and new faces varied between the participants and would
not necessarily be 50/50.
After the two phases, the participants were interviewed.
There were 9 primary questions asked, but if a participant ex-
pressed some suspicion regarding the movement of the faces,
or if they expressed that they could not perceive both faces
sometimes, a set of follow-up questions intervened (Table 1).
3 Results
Interviews
The division of participants according to the defined degrees
of awareness can be seen in Table 2. Very few participants (3)
Figure 5. The distribution of d’ values per participant divided up
by trial type. Participants were on average better able to determine
whether they recognized faces that were part of non-manipulated tri-
als. The horizontal lines represent the mean for each category.
explicitly noticed the manipulation that took place in the ex-
periment, while most participants (18) did not notice the ma-
nipulation but expressed experiencing frequent difficulties in
viewing the faces. While there are too few participants in each
group to achieve statistically significant differences between
the different categories, those participants (3) who made no
expressions regarding difficulties in viewing the faces still had
observable differences (in line with the whole group) in their
confidence, decision time, and number of transitions between
the trial type conditions. This indicates that there likely was
no technical difficulties which could have reduced the func-
tionality of manipulated trials such that ’blocked’ faces were
not blocked properly.
The type of response that was frequent for participants who
were categorized in group 2 was for instance that “many of the
faces blurred together” or that “they moved so fast that you
could not see both clearly.” What separated class 2 responses
with class 3 were that in the latter case participants explicitly
stated that they were suspicious to some degree that the faces
were manipulated (although not the movement of the faces but
their attributes). A typical class 3 response is for instance that
“I thought about whether the faces were recycled, and whether
they were modified,” or that “it felt as if it made up sometimes,
as if they were not real people, as if the faces’ width were ex-
tended.” Importantly, participants belonging to class 3 never
expressed that their eye movements affected the movement of
the faces, although they could have expressed that where they
looked first in a trial might have affected which face got ma-
nipulated into looking unreal. No participant was categorized
to class 4, as those participants who expressed that their eye
movements affected the movement of the faces did so with
confidence or highly accurate remarks. Those participants who
noticed the manipulation clearly expressed for instance that “I
tried to understand how it worked, it felt as if when the eyes
moved a lot the pictures moved even more,” or that “it felt as
if the system did that, that you should look at the picture in the
back.”
Regarding the participants’ feelings as decision-makers, 13
participants expressed feeling that they could make free deci-
sions, whilst the rest (18) told that they felt their decisions to
be constrained and insecure.
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Figure 6. The distribution of d’ values per participant divided up
by manipulated trials and whether the face was blocked or not in the
trial it belonged to. On average, participants were better recognizers
of faces that were ’forced’ to be viewed, compared to faces that were
’blocked’ from being viewed. The filled horizontal lines represent the
mean values for each category, while the dashed lines represent the
mean values for each category excluding the two outliers.
Quantitative data
The time spent per decision trial differed between the trial
types, as the participants spent on average more time on
the manipulated trials (M = 6.41 s, SD = 5.12 s; for non-
manipulated trials: M = 4.69 s, SD = 3.65 s). Participants’
average confidence responses were also lower for the manipu-
lated trials (M = 3.17, SD = 1.32; for non-manipulated trials:
M = 4.01, SD = 1.10). While in the manipulated trials where
participants were blocked in fixating the face furthest in the
direction movement (the ’front’ face), there was also a bias to
have spent more time on the face which was last in the direc-
tion movement (the ’back’ face) for the non-manipulated trials
(average time spent on the ’back’ face = 1.40 s, SD = 1.20 s;
average time spent on the ’front’ face = 0.77 s, SD = 0.73 s;
average relative time spent on the ’back’ face = 65%, SD =
13%).
Decisions
Whether the participants chose the ’back’ or the ’front’ face
was also modeled with a GLMM. The chosen factors were
trial type, attractivity, and their interaction. There was a signif-
icant fixed effect for manipulated trials as compared to to the
non-manipulated trials, β = 0.653, SE = 0.216, p = 0.00252
(a positive fixed effect means here that it positively affected
choosing the ’back’ face), for ’low’ attractivity as compared
to ’high’, β = -0.532, SE = 0.183, p = 0.00359, and the in-
teraction between manipulated trial type and ’low’ attractivity,
β = -0.747, SE = 0.283, p = 0.00834. No significant effects
were found for ’mid’ attractivity, β = -0.285, SE = 0.154, p
= 0.0647, and the interaction between manipulated trial type
and ’mid’ attractivity, β = -0.234, SE = 0.240, p = 0.329. The
model probabilities for choosing the ’back’ face can be seen
in Fig. 4.
Figure 7. The predictive probabilities and their standard errors of
responding correctly to the recognition task depending on where the
face was positioned in the decision trial, the attractivity of the face,
and whether the face belonged to a manipulated or non-manipulated
decision trial. The modeling excluded recognition trials with new
faces. mani = manipulated trial; nomani = non-manipulated trial.
Memory
The participants answered correctly whether the faces they
saw were part of the decision trials in 2766 out of 5580 tri-
als (49.6%). Out of the memory trials which progressed into
the participant deciding whether she thinks she chose the face
in the decision it was part of, they were correct in 649 out of
1566 trials (41.4%).
Signal detection analysis revealed that the average recog-
nition sensitivity for faces that were part of manipulated trials
was lower (M = 0.51, SD = 0.32) than the average recognition
sensitivity for faces that were part of non-manipulated trials
(M = 0.62, SD = 0.35) (see Fig. 5). Comparing how the recog-
nition sensitivity differed in manipulated trials between face
position (’back’ position was also called ’forced’, ’front’ posi-
tion was also called ’blocked’), it was found that participants
were on average less sensitive for blocked faces (M = 0.37, SD
= 0.36) than forced faces (M = 0.61, SD = 0.37), even when
eliminating two extreme outliers that are in favor of a differ-
ence (see Fig. 6).
A generalized linear mixed model was calculated to com-
pute the effects of trial type, attractivity, the position of the
face and the interaction between the position and trial type, on
being able to correctly recognize faces in the memory phase.
The significant fixed effects were ’front’ position as compared
to ’back’ position, β = -0.407, SE = 0.105, p <.001 (negative
fixed effects means here negative effect on correctly recogniz-
ing the faces); ’low’ attractivity as compared to ’high’ attrac-
tivity, β = -0.264, SE = 0.125, p = .0343; ’mid’ attractivity, β
= -0.260, SE = 0.0958, p = .00668. The fixed effect on trial
type which is manipulated as compared to non-manipulated,
showed no significance according to this model, β = -0.133,
SE = 0.103, p = .194, and the interaction between manipulated
trial type and ’front’ position was not significant either, β =
-0.0944, SE = 0.154, p = .539. The model probabilities for
correctly recognizing the faces can be seen in Fig. 7.
How trial type, attractivity, position and interaction be-
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Figure 8. The predictive probabilities and their standard errors of
responding correctly to the recognition task depending on where the
face was positioned in the decision trial, the attractivity of the face,
and whether the face belonged to a manipulated or non-manipulated
decision trial. The modeling excluded recognition trials with new
faces. mani = manipulated trial; nomani = non-manipulated trial.
tween position and trial type affected the task of answering
whether they think they preferred the face in the decision trial
it was part of, was also modeled with a GLMM. Significant
fixed effects were found for manipulated trials as compared to
non-manipulated trials, β = 0.472, SE = 0.221, p = .0328 (a
positive fixed effect here means that it had a positive effect on
answering correctly), and for the interaction between manip-
ulated trials and the ’front’ position, β = -0.877, SE = 0.390,
p = 0.0246. Non-significant effects were found for ’low’ at-
tractivity as compared to ’high’, β = -0.202, SE = 0.169, p =
0.233, ’mid’ attractivity, β = -0.157, SE = 0.142, p = 0.268,
and ’front’ position as compared to the ’back’ position, β =
0.309, SE = 0.212, p = 0.146. The model probabilities for
correctly remembering whether preferred the faces they rec-
ognized can be seen in Fig. 8.
Confidence ratings
The confidence ratings were modeled according to trial type,
attractivity, their interaction, decision time, and number of
transitions, with a linear mixed model. Their estimates and
standard errors can be seen in Fig. 9. The intercept represents
the mean in confidence (from 1 to 6 max) when the trial type
was non-manipulated, the attractivity was ’high’, and transi-
tions and decision time was 0. Most values are negative ex-
cept the interactions between trial type and attractivity, and
trial type and decision time. It is also the case that these inter-
action effects were non-significant, for the interaction effect
between manipulated trial and ’mid’ attractivity, β = -0.109,
SE = 0.100, p = .274; for the interaction between manipulated
trial and ’low’ attractivity, β = -0.103, SE = 0.118, p = .381; for
the interaction between manipulated trial and decision time, β
= 0.00259, SE = 0.0174, p = .884. There was a significant
effect for manipulated trials as compared to non-manipulated
trials, β = -0.652, SE = 0.158, p <.001, and ’mid’ attractivity
as compared to ’high’ attractivity, β = -0.257, SE = 0.0709,
p <.001, and for ’low’ attractivity, β = -0.385, SE = 0.0836,
p <.001, and for decision time, β = -0.0860, SE = 0.0208, p
<.001, and for transitions, β = -0.0112, SE = 0.00398, p =
.0108.
4 Discussion
The primary purpose of the experiment was to investigate
the extent to which humans monitor their oculomotor control,
specifically their intentions to move their gaze towards a tar-
get with saccades. Understanding whether it is the case that
people generally do monitor the intentions behind their eye
movements is interesting because there are conflicting mod-
els and frameworks that describe human cognition: The sym-
bolic framework would support the idea that it would be nat-
ural for humans to have accurate introspective access to their
action-planning, especially when it is goal-directed; while the
dynamic side would argue that decision-making and action-
control processes, even when goal-directed, are to a large
extent dynamic, situated, and outside of conscious control,
with introspective abilities being limited in depth and accu-
racy. Studying the oculomotor system is hence very favorable
in trying to shine a light on this conflict, as eye movements
are in general automatically controlled, while they can eas-
ily be consciously controlled if desired. Additionally, with
the developed method of creating mismatches between ocu-
lomotor intentions and reality, it was possible to investigate
whether decision-making could be biased by forcing partici-
pants to view one alternative while they were naive of such
manipulation.
Degree of awareness
Regarding whether people monitor their oculomotor inten-
tions, a few things can be asserted. Whatever neurological
activity it is that constitutes oculomotor intentions, be it mo-
tor command signals with involvement of activity from the
basal ganglia and the frontal eye field, or other types of activi-
ties, it does not seem that people in general consciously notice
whether these intentions correctly predict the outcome of the
eye movements or not, if one accepts the results of this study.
Given how the experiment was constructed, it arguably fol-
lows that if a person is able to notice that their eye movements
affect the movement of the faces, such that it becomes impos-
sible to view one of the faces, it is due to her monitoring the
intentions behind her goal-directed eye movements. But only
3 out of 31 participants did notice this explicitly. One could
argue that it is likely that it would not be possible to make par-
ticipants express awareness of ’errors’ between their intentions
and the outcome of their eye movements after a single or few
mismatches. However, the experiment was designed so that
if the participants did monitor their oculomotor intentions to
some degree, there was a high likelihood of participants pos-
itively expressing awareness of the manipulation. This is so
because almost half of the decision trials were manipulated,
with multiple mismatches occurring each such trial; and the
participants did self-control the amount of exposure towards
the manipulation, and had to answer many questions pertain-
ing the experience of the decisions in the interview. There-
fore, as the majority of participants did not notice mismatches
between intentions and outcome according to the analysis of
their verbal responses, it is here argued that the participants
were not consciously monitoring the mismatches.
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Figure 9. The fixed effects for the coefficient of the model on confidence rating, together with standard errors. The intercept represents the
mean when the trial type is non-manipulated, the faces are ’high’ in attractivity, and decision time and transitions are set at 0. All significant
effects, those from ’transitions’ to ’trialtypemani’, are negative. ’Transition’ refer to the amount of transitions or attempts to transition between
one face to the other.
On the other hand, it is highly possible that the manipula-
tion affected participants consciously in other ways, such as
their sense of agency, and confidence in their ability to make
accurate decisions in a visually demanding task. This is sup-
ported by the fact that participants’ confidence ratings were
significantly lower in manipulated trials. It is also supported
from the verbal rapports the participants provided with, as the
majority expressed difficulties in perceiving both faces clearly
sometimes, which predictably follows from the manipulation.
These results suggest that the symbolic framework, and
the goal-directed action models that model cognition similarly,
are wrong in proposing that humans have high access to men-
tal states that relate to the active situation, and that specific
types of ’conscious-ready’ mental events are always necessary
in ’higher-order’ mental activity, such as deciding what actions
to do in a task. The dynamic framework on the other hand sup-
ports the idea that ’higher-order’ cognitive task, such as decid-
ing which actions to do, can arise naturally as an interaction
with the task, with sensory information together with previous
learning feeding the decisions without the need of full con-
scious deliberation, which would require too much attentional
resources from an evolutionary point of view.
The predictive processing view, which is an evolvement of
the dynamic framework, additionally is able to explain what
processes it could be that could lead to a person becoming
aware of mismatches between predictions of outcomes and the
outcomes themselves, given that baseline human cognition is
not symbolic. With this framework, cognition is viewed as
primarily predictive in nature, but it does not need conscious-
ness to predict things, which is an explanation for why the
majority of the participants in this study did not consciously
become aware of experimental manipulation, only that is was
’difficult to see things’. And as was shown by Ehinger, Ko¨nig
and Ossando´n (2015), error signals occur after predictive mis-
matches that arise as a saccade-related change is made, which
surprises the visual cortex. The case that 3 participants in this
experiment did express awareness of the gaze-contingent ma-
nipulation, suggests that they possibly were sensitive to these
error signals. Although, it could also be due to increased at-
tention towards eye movements, as they knew their eyes were
measured and might have suspected some type of experimen-
tal manipulation.
Decision-making
It certainly was the case that the participants’ decision-making
was affected, even as they were naive to the manipulation,
which is supported by the rapports from the participants. Ma-
nipulated trials, which forced participants to view the ’back’
face, increased the likelihood that participants would choose
the ’back’ face with about 15% compared to non-manipulated
trials, to a 70% chance in choosing that alternative (Fig. 8);
but that only applied to trials which included highly attractive
faces (highly attractive according to the provided norming ta-
bles from the database), which fits with research that show that
increased attention towards an alternative during the decision
process increases the likelihood of choosing that alternative,
but only if it is attractive, with the opposite effect for aversive
stimuli (Armel, Beaumel & Rangel, 2008). For manipulated
trials with unattractive faces, the likelihood of choosing the
’back’ face dropped down by 30%, so that it was only a 40%
chance of choosing the only alternative that they had properly
12
seen, even though the participants had not fixated on the ’front’
face at all and hence had a worse estimation of how that face
looked like. The participants would likely have become aware
of that the faces matched in attractivity during the experiment,
so choosing the ’front’ face even though they have not seen it
properly could not be rationalized with the case that the ’front’
face might have been much more attractive by chance.
Effects on recognition and source memory
What is surprising from the data collected is the degree to
which participants could distinguish ’blocked’ faces. Even
though the participants could only view the ’blocked’ faces
peripherally, their average sensitivity (d’) was still above 0.
Modeling their recognition rates revealed that the fixed ef-
fect from manipulation compared to non-manipulated trials
was non-significant, although that includes both ’blocked’
and ’forced’ faces, which makes it unsurprising that the ma-
nipulation factor in itself was non-significant. What can be
said is that there was a large and significant difference be-
tween front/blocked and back/forced faces in the manipu-
lated condition (’blocked’ and ’forced’ does not apply to non-
manipulated trials). Which means that the faces that were
blocked through manipulation were significantly harder to rec-
ognize, for all attractivity-levels, although faces with higher
attractivity were significantly easier to recognize in all combi-
nations compared to the two other attractivity levels.
The data on participants answering whether they think the
chose the presented face in the decision trial it took part in
includes an interesting shift in accuracy when changing what
position the face had and whether the trial was manipulated or
not. On faces participants had claimed they recognized (which
were all trials where they were asked whether they think they
chose the face in the decision phase), they were on average
significantly worse in correctly remembering faces that were
positioned ’back’ and took part in a non-manipulated trial.
This is likely due to the increased bias in looking at the ’back’
face in manipulated trials, although that has not been included
in the model due to difficulties in modeling that factor in a
way that represents it correctly. Then, when shifting over to
faces that were positioned in the front, participants were sig-
nificantly worse at remembering whether they chose the faces
in the decision phase if they belonged to a manipulated trial.
This is likely due to the fact that the participants general abil-
ity to remember the faces that were positioned in the front in
manipulated trials was worse. There was no significant effect
on attractivity and source memory, although the pattern sug-
gests that there was an effect, but smaller when compared to
its effect in the recognition task.
So it does seem to be the case that even if the faces were
separated by 5 visual degrees, there was a slight ability to see
the ’blocked’ faces, and that could possibly have affected the
decision-making bias. But if it did affect the bias in decision-
making, it would likely have lessened the bias in decision-
making for the ’forced’ faces. The significant bias that has
been observed in this study is then further supported by the
fact that there were some visual ’leakages’ which made it eas-
ier for participants to see blocked faces, and hence made the
decisions more equal than the goal of the design which was to
make the manipulated decisions almost fully unequal.
Confidence ratings
As previously mentioned, the average participant confidence
rating was significantly lower on manipulated trials. Their rat-
ings also decreased significantly when the faces were not in the
’high’ attractivity group. But the interaction between manipu-
lation and attractivity was not significant, so it can be said that
no matter whether the participants can see both faces clearly,
lower attractivity made participants less confident in their de-
cisions. What was also the case was that the longer participants
spent on the decision (and how many times they switched or
tried to switch between the faces, which are co-linear fac-
tors), the less confident the participants became. This was the
case even though an interaction effect between decision time
and trial type was included. Given that participants controlled
the decision time themselves, it seems likely that participants
spent more time looking at the faces if they were uncertain of
which face to choose, and that more observation-time might
not have helped much as the task was visually demanding.
The problem with having confidence ratings saying any-
thing about the participants’ sense of agency is that confi-
dence ratings are likely affected by many factors–one’s sense
of agency is only one of those. But no developed measures
for sense of agency could be applied in this task, as the few
implicit measures that exist, sensory attenuation and temporal
binding (as opposed to explicit measures where participants
are asked questions pertaining to their sense of agency, in for
example questionnaires; see Dewey & Knoblich, 2014), re-
quire controlling the experimental events strictly, and involve
participants doing specific individual actions. In this study, the
specific actions we were interested in were extremely frequent,
and in the minds’ of the participants the eye movements they
made were uninteresting (as long as they did not notice how
the manipulation occurred), and that had to be the case as we
needed naive participants. But given that the confidence rat-
ings did significantly decrease, it makes sense that the partici-
pants’ sense of agency would be lowered in an experiment like
this, although it cannot be proven.
Limitations
The primary limitation with the experiment regarded the post-
test interview. There are some obvious limitations in inter-
viewing participants and then analyzing their responses as in-
dications of their degree of awareness. It could fully be the
case that participants were not motivated, or had not the con-
cepts and language to express the feeling of failure with re-
gards to oculomotor intentions (as the concept of oculomotor
intentions is not common in public discourse). There is also
the balance between activating participants to fully exhaust in
language their subjective experience, so that we can determine
whether they did or did not become aware of failures of oculo-
motor intentions, and on the other hand not to provide leading
questions that participants would use to create a confabulation
to fit the question. Even explicitly stating the manipulation
at the end and analyzing the participants’ responses can not
be a secure measure of participant awareness, as the partici-
pants’ responses can be confabulated even here to fit the de-
mand. However, most participants did not express that they
noticed mismatches between intentions and the result of their
eye movements, even when told about the manipulation in the
debriefing, and no participant did express that they monitored
their oculomotor intentions directly. The participants who no-
ticed the manipulation also expressed only noticing how the
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system functioned and the role of their eye movements in the
system, so it still is not exactly clear what these participants
really experienced. It is for instance not clear if they actually
thought about intentions, or just the eye movement effect in
the movement of the faces in the experiment.
Summary and suggestions for further research
The results from the study suggest that oculomotor intentions
are not explicitly monitored by most people. If some people
do, it might have to do with sensitivity towards error signals
that likely occur after gaze-contingent mismatches. This sup-
ports the idea that we humans generally do not know ourselves
as good as we like to think, and that we do not have full intro-
spective access to all our ’higher-level’ mental activity, such
as deciding which action to express physically. But the study
does not exclude that oculomotor intentions are completely
unavailable to conscious deliberation, both before and after an
intentional action has been made.
Given that most participants did not notice the manipula-
tion even when almost half of all trials were manipulated, and
that they controlled the duration of exposure to the manipula-
tion, a further step would be to push an experimental design of
similar nature to the limit, to determine how much would be
required for participants to spontaneously notice the mismatch
between their oculomotor intentions and the result of their eye
movements. A sophisticated way of doing this is with the use
of virtual reality (VR). It could be possible to situate partici-
pants in a virtual environment, where the whole environment
itself, or parts of it, are gaze-contingent, such that participants
could be tested in more a ’natural’ environment (more natural
than sitting still in front of a monitor and making eye move-
ments towards faces that rapidly jump on a screen), where in-
tentions to move one’s gaze towards objects would be easier to
define and measure, than the small and frequent intentional eye
movements that occurred in this experiment. In more ’natural’
situations, it might turn out that people generally do monitor
such mismatches between intentions and outcome, or moni-
tor other informative perceptual disturbances that could occur
when the brain by habit predicts the visual information before
the movement, but receives something completely unexpected
after the movement.
5 Conclusion
This study provides evidence that humans do not generally
monitor their oculomotor intentions. It was also found that
decision-making could be biased by blocking participants in
viewing one of the alternatives in a forced-choice task, with-
out participants knowing that they were manipulated in that
way. This suggests that models that assume that intentions are
a necessary step prior to a goal-directed action need to be re-
vised.
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